DTIC ADA264877: Kurdish Problem - Federalism or an Emerging State

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KURDISH PROBLEM <
FEDERALISM OR
AN EMERGING STATE

BY

CLARENCE J. MORAN
Central intelligence Agency Civilian

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Approved for public release.
Distribution Is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1993

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:
TITLE:
FORMAT:
DATS :

Clarence J. Moran, GS-15, CIA

Kurdish Problem-Federalism or an Emerging State
Individual Study Project

22 Feb 1993 PAGES: 36 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Whether the Kurds will successfully achieve democracy for Iraq
and autonomy for Kurdistan is more a decision in the hands of US
policy makers than the Kurds. Before that question can be
addressed the larger issue of "autonomy today, but a separate state
tomorrow" has to be ounridered . No one wants to support a separate
state which would mean dissolution of the territorial integrity of
Iraq and upsetting the regional balance of power. That would also
run counter to respecting the concept of a nation's sovereignty
which is so vital to maintaining order in the world. when the
national interests of the US are considered, especially in the
strategic sense or in terms of natural resources, it is difficult
to make a case for supporting the Kurds beyond humanitarian
assistance. The Persian Gulf War, however, presented the US a new
scenario, highlighted by President Bush's call for the Kurds in
northern Iraq and the Shia in southern Iraq to rise against Saddam
Hussein. The resulting crushing of both revolts by Saddam, and
ensuing flight and agony suffered by the Kurds brought them on
center stage for the world to view. The US, along with coalition
governments, in response to media pressure and the humanitarian
needs of the fleeing Kurds, established a security zone in northern
Iraq for the Kurds, and later in southern Iraq for the Shia. This
has effectively split Iraq into three parts. The Kurds by holding
elections, establishing a government, and providing political and
civil administration in their area, Iraqi Kurdistan, now in essence
have de facto autonomy. This autonomy, however, cannot be
sustained without US and coalition military protection. This study
explores whether the Kurds are capable of self-government and the
implications of US policy on the future governmental structure in
Iraq .

ii

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

rh« views expressed in this paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Department of Defense ox any of Its agencies.

This document say not be released for open publication
until it has been cleared by the appropriate military
service or government agency.

KURDISH PROBLEM-FEDERALISM OR AN EMERGING STATE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
by

Clarence J. Moran
Central Intelligence Agency ~

Dr. Douglas V, Johnson II
Project Adviser

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A; Approved for public
releasej distribution is unllmlted*-

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DTIC

CnA

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By

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR;
TITLE :
FORMAT;
DATE;

Clarence J. Moran, GS-15, CIA

Kurdish Problem-Federalism or an Emerging State
Individual Study Project

22 Feb 1993 PAGES; 36 CLASSIFICATION; Unclassified

Whether the Kurds will successfully achieve democracy for Iraq
and autonomy for Kurdistan is more a decision in the hands of US
policy makers than the Kurds. Before that question can be
addressed the larger issue of "autonomy today, but a separate state
tomorrow" has to be considered. No one wants to support a separate
state which would mean dissolution of the territorial integrity of
Iraq and upsetting the regional balance of power. That would also
run counter to respecting the concept of a nation's sovereignty
which is so vital to maintaining order in the world. When the
national interests of the US are considered, especially in the
strategic sense or in terms of natural resources, it is difficult
to make a case for supporting the Kurds beyond humanitarian
assistance. The Persian Gulf War, however, presented the US a new
scenario, highlighted by President Bush's call for the Kurds in
northern Iraq and the Shia in southern Iraq to rise against Saddam
Hussein. The resulting crushing of both revolts by Saddam, and
ensuing flight and agony suffered by the Kurds brought them on
center stage for the world to view. The US, along with coalition
governments, in response to media pressure and the humanitarian
needs of the fleeing Kurds, established a security zone in northern
Iraq for the Kurds, and later in southern Iraq for the Shia. This
has effectively split Iraq into three parts. The Kurds by holding
elections, establishing a government, and providing political and
civil administration in their area, Iraqi Kurdistan, now in essence
have de facto autonomy. This autonomy, however, cannot be
sustained without US and coalition military protection. This study
explores whether the Kurds are capable of self-government and the
implications of US policy on the future governmental structure in
Iraq.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1 . Oilfields and Facilities

Figure 2 . Ethnoreligious Groups

Figure 3 . Dissident (Kurdish & Shiite) Areas

iii

THE KURDISH PROBLEM
FEDERALISM OR AM EMERGENT STATE

INTRODUCTION

The plight of the Kurds is but one of several major problems
in the Middle East which has attracted United States (US) and world
attention. The US, pressured by the media and responding to the
inhumane conditions being suffered by the Kurds after their
uprising against Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War, has
become a primary provider of security to the Kurds in Iraqi
Kurdistan. This support is important not only to prevent short¬
term violence and instability, but to increase the possibility of
a lasting peace in the area. While the US must be careful not to
become the world's de facto policeman, it is not in the US
interest, as the world's sole super power, to be perceived as
having turned away from its responsibilities in the aftermath of
the Gulf War. The War in the Persian Gulf has had a profound
impact on the political and military thinking and attitudes of both
the governments and populations of the US and Iraq as well as other
states with influence in the region. Changes in alliances between
countries of the Middle East and the US and within the region are
inevitable even though some governments are experiencing difficulty
transitioning from heavy handed policies which protect the status
quo. Governments which become proactive in managing change,
however, are likely to be the governments least adversely affected
by changes as they evolve.

This paper reviews the evolution of the Kurds in Iraq by
examining their transition from a powerless ethnic group to a

growing political entity that will play an instrumental role in the
future status of Iraq as a nation state. The focus is on the
potential of the Kurdish people to obtain some degree of autonomy
and then successfully function as part of a central pluralistic
governmental framework within Iraq. Autonomy is sometimes
misunderstood, but according to Lawrence Ziring of Western Michigan
University:

Autonomy refers to administrative decision
making by and for a particular ethnic,
linguistic, religious, or otherwise specific
cultural entity. Autonomy is not the same as
sovereignty. An autonomous region operates
within the confines of a larger political
entity that is sovereign and hence preeminent.

Autonomous regions, for example, are not
empowered to organize their own army, carry on
their own foreign policy, or issue their own
currency. They have delegated powers that
allow them to administer their daily affairs,
but they do not possess independent political
power.''

Even so, the thought of such a proposition increases the fears of
Iraq's neighbors who are concerned that this would only be a first
step in the quest for an independent Kurdish state. After all,
several of these neighbors have large Kurdish populations that they
have oppressed since the fall of the Ottoman empire.

It could be argued that the past instability caused by the
Kurds in their persistent quest for autonomy has contributed to the
balance of power in the region by requiring local governments (who
were not always friendly to the US) to commit an array of police,
security operatives and military assets to keep the Kurds in check.
This notwithstanding, the Kurds in northern Iraq are now
beneficiaries of the Persian Gulf War, and it must be recognized

2

that unprecedented change is underway regarding relations between
the Kurds and other opposition groups and how they will ultimately
deal with the central government in Baghdad. In this paper the
premise is accepted that the Kurds have already attained a degree
of autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan made possible by the security zone
established by and protected by coalition military forces.
Therefore, the effort expended here is to explore whether the Kurds
possess the capability to self rule, and the sophistication to do
so in a manner in which their neighbors will acquiesce and support
from their coalition sponsors will continue.

KURDS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Most of the modern nations of the Middle East were created as
a result of agreements between the British and the French at the
end of World War I . Much of the region had belonged to the Turkish
Ottoman Empire for over 400 years. Since Turkey was defeated in
the war, Britain and France became the chief beneficiaries of the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The area was divided into
British and French spheres of influence by the arbitrary drawing
of national borders without regard to ethnic and religious lines,
or ancient water rights and tribal holdings. Great Britain in
1918, only four days after signing the armistice, occupied what
had been the oil rich Ottoman province of Mosul, in the southern
part of Kurdistan. The Turks bitterly protested, but Ottoman
Turkey was too weak to oppose the British.

3

In 1920, the British and other Western allies established, in
the Treaty of Sevres, a Kurdish homeland out of the remnants of an
area in the eastern Ottoman Empire which the Kurds had
demographically dominated for centuries. In 1921, the Turks, after
having defeated the Greek army in Anatolia gained the leverage to
demand the treaty's revision. The British then abandoned the idea
of a pro-British Kurdistan and concentrated on keeping oil-rich
Mosul. The plan was to attach the Kurdish inhabited Mosul area to
two other former Turkish provinces — Sunni Baghdad in northern
Mesopotamia and Shiite Basra in southern Mesopotamia. This would
have created a wealthy, pro-British protectorate strategically
located on the Gulf.^ These early maneuvers by the powers of the
day to control both natural resources and transportation routes
with little regard for the indigenous people reflect the accepted
norms of victors of war throughout history. The lack of
sophistication and overall cohesion, tribalism, multiple language
dialects and most importantly the lack of a powerful sponsor are
factors which contributed to the Kurds being left again without any
territory of their own after World War I. As we trace the Kurds
over the years since World War I, it becomes clear that successive
governments in Iraq and the other countries with large Kurdish
populations have, in varying extremes, attempted to assimilate the
Kurds into their national fold by eradicating the Kurdish culture
and suppressing them politically.

In 1925, a League of Nations commission mandated that the
province of Mosul be incorporated into the new British protectorate

4

called Iraq. It also provided that the Kurds were to be given
local autonomy and Kurdish made the official language. The Turks,
determined to be pro-Western, finally agreed to give up Mosul and
all of its oil for a mere 500,000 British pounds. Many Turks
consider this a most unfortunate decision and have never accepted
this oil-rich, non-Arab region as part of an Arab state. ^ T a e
Kurds, however, have never been able to achieve autonomy or the
freedom of unrestricted use of the Kurdish language. They remain
the only grouping of over 15 mil ..ion persons which has not achieved
some form of national statehood.'^

These Kurdish issues of autonomy and language have been
central tc the problems confronting Iraq since it was established
in 1920. The name Kurdistan refers to an area situated on the
border areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and the former Soviet
Union which comprises the pastoral homeland of the nomadic Kurds of
Indo-European origin. The Kurds have existed as a tribal people
with their own cultural tradition and language for at least 3000
years. Even so and despite their strong desire for independence
from external authority, the Kurds have never been united under one
ruler- The British Foreign an d Commonwealth Office reports in a
May 1992 Background Brief that tribal divisions have always been
deep, and that this coupled with political differences between
conservative feudal leaders and left-wing radicals have led to easy
exploitation by central governments.^ Although the Kurds are
generally described as being a nomadic tribal people, many are
settled agriculturists and most in Iraq live in urban areas.

5

Increasing migration to urban areas in Iraq has tended to weaken
tribal bonds, although most Kurds can trace their origins to
particular tribes.^

The Kurds were generally subject to the nominal jurisdiction
of the Shah of Iran or the Ottoman sultan until the end of World
War I. Nevertheless, government authority was never universally
accepted by the Kurds in either the Iranian or Ottoman areas. The
years through 1932 saw many tribal uprisings and an attempt by the
monarchy to assimilate tribal Kurds, but this activity caused a
breach between the nationalist Kurds and the government. Social
upheavals and internal political instability involving opposition
groups have played a major role in Iraq's perception of its
national security. This, along with recurrent revolts by the
Kurdish minority, have consistently brought harsh responses from
successive regimes to neutralize opposition forces and to restore
order

Through the years until the 1960 's in spite of the
unwillingness of successive Iraqi governments to render more than
lip service to Kurdish autonomy, Iraqi Kurds enjoyed many basic
freedoms and perhaps most significantly, recognition of their
separate ethnic status. While the Iraqi Kurds were generally free
to do as they pleased so long as they caused no problems to the
Iraqi government, the Kurds in Turkey and to a lesser extent a
Iran were being persecuted more severely as Kurds.®

The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by Mulla Mustapha
Barzani conducted a fierce campaign in the 1960 's against the

6

Baghdad government, which feared that Kurdish successes would lead
to the secession of Kirkuk, a major oil producing area. The Baath
Party which had come to power in 1968, determined to end political
turmoil, by 1970, had thwarted several coup attempts and achieved
an increased level of stability within the country.^ The Baath
Party believed that most Western countries, particularly the United
States, opposed the goal of Arab unity as evidenced by the
partition of Palestine and creation of the state of Israel. This,
and the subsequent unwavering support to the security of Israel by
the US, led Iraq to closer relations with the Soviet Union which
had supported the Arabs during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli
Wars.^° As the KDP campaign gained momentum, the Baath Party
realizing the overall need to stabilize things agreed to
negotiations, which in March 1970 culminated in a 15-point peace
plan. Salient provisions of the plan stipulated:

— that Kurds would participate fully in the government and
army, and one national vice-president would be a Kurd;

— that Kurdish officials would administer areas populated by
a Kurdish majority;

— that Kurdish areas would receive a fair share of economic
resources ;

— that Kurdish nationality would be recognized and Kurdish
designated an official language in Kurdish areas with Arabic; and
— a census would be taken to determine those areas with a
Kurdish majority.

7

The Iraqi government, however, made little progress in
implementing the agreement even though i.t later promulgated an
autonomy law in 1974. This was the first real show of how shrewd
Saddam Hussein could be regarding the Kurdish issue and his
commitment to Arab nationalism. The tactics employed were to
alternate the use of force with major concessions designed to
appease and delay the Kurds until Saddcun could consolidate his
strength. Then ruthless suppression followed. The 1974 autonomy
law was rejected by the Kurds as falling short of the previous
agreement with special emphasis on the lack of representation in
the central government. Control of oil-rich Kirkuk also remained
an resolved issue as the Iraqi government failed to conduct a
census. The Iraqi government feared that a census would show a
Kurdish and Turcoman majority, thus substantiating the arguments
for incorporation of Kirkuk into the Kurdish autonomous region.
Fighting again erupted with the Kurds receiving support from Iran
until the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran.
Subsequently, the Iraqi government initiated a construction program
in Kurdish areas, redistributed land and allowed the return of some
40,000 Kurds who had been resettled in southern Ira^. In July
1983, during the Iran/Iraq War, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK), created in 1975 by a breakaway faction of the KDP as a
leftist, urban and modernizing organization led by Jalal Talabani,
joined the KDP in fighting against the Iraqi government. The KDP
initiative was supported by Iranian troops and Iraqi Shiite
elements armed with weapons supplied by Iran.^^

8

By 1987/ Kurdish military and political strength had
progressively grown through rapprochement of the KDP and PUK and
subsequent formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, a coalition of
five Kurdish parties. This was a giant step forward for the Kurds
inasmuch as it signaled the beginning of a greater understanding of
the concepts of organization, unity and cohesion that would later
serve them well in the post-Persian Gulf War era. In any case,
once the Iranian military threat diminished in the south, Saddam
unleashed a major offensive action against the Kurds in the north
destroying some 3000 Kurdish villages and relocating some 300,000
persons to camps, first in the south and later in the north. He
eliminated a large number of male Barzani tribe members, and used
chemical weapons killing several thousand more Kurds.

In late February 1991, just after Iraq's defeat by the
multinational coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War, large
numbers of Shia in the areas between Basra and Baghdad as well as
Kurds in the north revolted against the central government in
Baghdad. Both groups had been encouraged by public calls from
George Bush, the US President, to revolt against Saddam and his
regime. Saddam, however, was able to marshal his forces and
successfully put down both revolts, containing the Shia in the
south, and causing hundreds of thousands of Kurds to flee and take
refuge in the mountains along the Iraqi/Turkish border. The
United Nations and US led coalition forces intervened on a
humanitarian basis and established a temporary security zone in the
north, relocated the Kurds from the mountains and provided life

9

sustaining humanitarian assistance to them. The Iraqi government
cooperated with the UN and signed Memoranda of Understanding
allowing this humanitarian endeavor to proceed. Iraq, however,
continues to violate the terms of UN resolution 688 which demands
an end to repression in Iraq and cooperation with humanitarian
ef forts

CULTURE & RELIGION: EXPLOITATION, EXAGGERATION OR MYTH

The Kurds have been perceived as a warlike, dirty, backward,
illiterate and generally slow-witted people.^* They have often
been held in scorn and contempt. Their long history of warlike
activities as reflected in them serving as mercenaries in the
armies of the Middle East and southern Caucasus have led to
characterizations of them being violence prone. As late as August
1992, the Kurds were being branded as "bandits" by Iraqi Dictator
Saddam Hussein as they levied taxes at checkpoints on Turkish
truckers bringing goods through Iraqi Kurdistan and returning with
oil products from the large refinery in Mosul. The sale of
gasoline in Turkey by these vendors, in violation of the
international trade embargo against Iraq, brings about 150 times
the price paid for it.”"^ The banditry (if one chooses to label it
that) associated with this activity might well be overshadowed by
the previous pressure tactic of the Saddam government of stopping
the shipment of all fuel, food and supplies to the Kurdish areas,
including children's vaccines donated by the United Nations.^®
Without the supplies being brought to and through Iraqi Kurdistan

10

on the road from Turkey and the revenues generated from the
taxation on this activity, Kurdish survival would indeed be further
strained. Such activity is not new as for centuries each of the
major Empires — Greek, Roman, Mongul, Persian and Ottoman have had
to contend with the Kurds who ostensibly demanded some remuneration
for use of the major communication and transportation routes they
controlled between the West and the Far East. This activity has
added to the perception of the Kurds as being bandits.

Even as recently as the summer of 1992, there were some local
militias operating independently in the countryside of Kurdistan
who were levying taxes at checkpoints and appropriating vehicles
and machinery to sell in Iran.^’ A primary issue is whether the
Kurdish people can unite behind the governmental legislature that
was elected in May and sworn in on July 4th, 1992. This would give
some legitimacy to actions that would otherwise be viewed as
banditry in the international community. This newly elected
government has appointed a police force and school administration.
It also levies taxes, collects garbage, delivers mail and oversees
an army.

The Kurds have been perceived by others in literature as a
highly illiterate people with severe dialectal differences within
their language which serve as obstacles to their unity. Although
there are four major Kurdish dialect groups, all varieties of
Kurdish are Indo-European and thus belong to the same linguistic
family as the Persian language. Efforts to develop a standard,
pan-Kurdish language despite many attempts by Kurds have been

11

unsuccessful. This is attributable, in large part, to the physical
fragmentation, mutual isolation and constant restrictions suffered
by the Kurds. Such a goal is not insurmountable as was
demonstrated by neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran
and Syria who overcame their own dialectal differences.^^ These
countries were able to overcome the problem, at least partially,
through the central government promulgation of official national
languages and educational policies that enhanced the learning of a
common language.

Literacy is considered a measure of modernization and often
reflects the policies of central governments toward their ethnic
minorities. While there is little statistical documentation
supporting the exact extent of literacy and in what language, we do
know that either the teaching of the Kurdish language itself or
teaching subjects using Kurdish has been restricted in varying
degrees in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. Literacy in Arabic,
however, has been encouraged. Levels of literacy tend to be higher
in areas where Kurdish is used in school curriculums. Some
estimates reflect that as many as 91 percent of Kurdish women are
illiterate. Iraqi Kurds have received sporadic education at the
primary and secondary levels in Kurdish as well as Arabic and have
enjoyed the benefits of their own university established at
Sulaymania (recently moved to Arbil). Thus, Iraqi Kurds by far
have the highest literacy rate and are the best educated of all
Kurds in Kurdistan.

12

with an average literacy rate of 52 percent, the Kurds in
Iran are the least literate of the major Iranian nationalities.^^
By contrast, the Persian language has traditionally been the medium
for instruction in Iran, although since the Islamic Revolution of
1979, use of minority languages has been allowed in the press and
mass media. Ethnic literature was also allowed to be taught in
schools at all levels. Undoubtedly an increase in literacy and
general education will be reflected in the next Iranian census to
be taken in 1996. Turkey forbade the use of Kurdish in 1924, but
partially and unofficially relaxed the policy in the 1950 's.
However, in the 1980 's the policy was reversed and toughened. Such
restrictions have resulted in a marked imbalance in the level of
education between Kurds and other citizens in Turkey, with Kurds
attaining less than half the national average for education. In
late 1991, the Turks officially sanctioned the publication of a few
Kurdish newspapers and journals. It is too soon to know whether
Turkey will continue and possibly further liberalize policies to
include the educational realm which would enhance the socioeconomic
integration of the Kurds into Turkish society.

In any case, we know that language has long been a unifying
issue among the Kurdish people and symbolizes the very continuation
of the Kurdish culture. All Kurdish national groups have
consistently demanded the use of Kurdish as an official language.
While these efforts have been uniformly thwarted in Iraq, Turkey,
Iran and Syria, Kurdish music has come to symbolize Kurdish
resistance to the anti-language policies. In several countries.

13

even the singing of baby lullabies is illegal. Pauletta Otis in a
case study on the Kurds, completed for the US Department of
Defense, concludes that "Language has taken on a symbolic
character far above its functional value. An argument could be
made that it is just this type of symbolism that can unify a people
or groups involved in political struggles. This is certainly
apparent in the persistency of the Kurds in seeking to maintain
their language. History is replete with examples of the
suppression of minority languages by repressive or majority
governments as a measure to control minority populations in the
assimilation process, ensuring the stability of the state or status
quo. Language is viewed as basic to the perpetuation of a nation.
Whether the Kurds have fully understood the overall positive
ramifications of the language issue beyond the strictly cultural
aspects is not clear.

Kurdistan is an unofficially recognized, contiguous area
situated on the borders of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. Most
Kurds are Sunni Muslims. These include the Kurds living in Iraq,
Turkey, Iran and Syria. The Arabs living in the area of Iraq
immediately to the south of the security zone established by the
coalition forces are also Sunni Muslims who comprise about 35
percent of the Iraqi population. This area includes Baghdad and
currently the oil producing areas of Mosul and Kirkuk which are
located on the southern edge of Kurdistan. (map Figure 1) Although
Mosul is mostly inhabited by Arabs, the surrounding area is
primarily populated by Kurds. Most of the residents of Kirkuk are

14

also Kurds. These areas are strictly controlled by Saddam
Hussein's government. About 62 percent of the Iraqi population are
Arab Shiite Muslims. They predominately inhabit the southeastern
part of Iraq which borders Iran. (map Figure 2) The great majority
of the Iranian people are Persian Shiite Muslims.

Some political analysts have voiced strong concern about the
potential risks to western interests that would be associated with
an Iraq ruled by Shiite Muslims. This concern peaked when Muslims
violently rejected the western way of life in Iran following the
expulsion of the Shah. Even though Iran has become more moderate
under President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, many in the US still vividly
recall the 1979 takeover of the US Embass- with disdain. The
Islamic fundamentalist and anti-western fervor inspired by the
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, seen nightly on television news
programs in the west, promoted anti-Islamic perceptions in the west
and further damaged US-Iranian relations. This display of anti-
Americanism led to a fear of the spread of Iranian Shiite
fundamentalism to Iraq and directly affected US policies which
became more favorable toward Iraq, The extent of animosity that
existed between predominately Shiite Iran and Iraq, as demonstrated
by the eight-year Iran/Iraq War from 1980-1988, might well have
been under estimated by Western observers.

In retrospect, it is quite clear that a fundamental
incompatibility existed between Iraqi Arab nationalism and Iranian
Islamic fundamentalism.^® The belief that ties between Persian
Shiite Muslims and Arab Shiite Muslims would automatically prevail

15

over nationalism was simply incorrect. The underlying differences
between the two states proved too difficult to reconcile and
ultimately led to the Iran/Iraq War. During the war, the US tilted
toward and provided some assistance to Iraq in an attempt to
contain Shiite Islamic fundamental' sm and maintain a balance of
power in the region. Saddam, when given the chance, further
neutralized the appeal of revolutionary Iran to Iraqi Shiites by
allowing the Iranians to bomb Shiite areas of Iraq with virtual
impunity .

The lingering fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism
later constrained the US in its response to the Shia call for
support after they rebelled against the Saddam Hussein regime in
the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Iraqi Kurds caught
in the middle of the Iraqi escapades for dominance have given their
support to whatever patron was more supportive of their cause.
This has raised the question of Kurdish loyalties although the
strong implication is that the Kurds have been primarily interested
in achieving their own goals. During the Iran/Iraq War, the Kurds
were generally opposed to both Iran and Iraq given the nature of
their repressive policies toward the Kurds. The Kurds, rather than
risk supporting the losing side and incurring the wrath of the
winner, chose to play both ends against the middle. While the
Kurds survived the war, they are now labeled as traitors and
disloyal elements by both Iran and Iraq.^°

The US, its western allies, and the Gulf Cooperation Council
countries are all opposed to the idea of Islamic fundamentalist

16

rule in Iraq. Therefore, it is important to take a closer look at
Islam and put it in a more correct perspective as we help construct
policies for the region. Clearly, the Kurdish problem in northern
Iraq cannot be adequately addressed without developing viable
policies in dealing with the Shia problem in southern Iraq. It
could be argued that Islam per se poses no threat to western
societies. However, it is just as important to understand that
Islam can and has served as a ur tying force for political and
military movements for many centuries. Islam is a powerful
motivator for the masses and could become the dynamic element for
political change.

Saddam uses Islam as a galvanizer and to reach the people in
the streets of Iraq. His ruthless behavior over time, however, has
seemingly disallowed him the complete seduction of Arabs to rally
behind his causes. For example, when Saddam called upon Islam to
unite Arabs in a holy war against the coalition forces, it simply
did not work- Nonetheless, the powers of Islam as a unifying
element can be especially significant where there exists
inefficient, and/or unfair and discriminatory governmental systems
wielding power over majority Muslim populations. It is important,
however, that governments dealing with situations such as the
Iran/Iraq balance of power understand the limitations of Islam so
that appropriate diplomatic or military responses can be used when
necessary. Religion appears to be but one factor in the very
complex business of analysis of the motivations involving people in
the struggle between ethnicity, nationalism and self-rule.

17

Before the coalition established the Shia security zone in
southern Iraq in 1992, some political analysts believed the Shia
might come to power in Iraq by taking advantage of their vastly
larger numbers and overthrow the ruling Sunnis led by Saddam
Hussein. This thinking was more common prior to the 1980 's, but
was ostensibly not sufficiently alleviated by the Iran/ Iraq War.
Even though Iraq had expelled between 40,000 and 120,000 Persian
Shia before the war, this neutralization of the threat of an
Iranian sponsored fifth column did not allay the fears of a
possible Iraqi Shia revolt. There were good reasons for such
thinking. Almost all of the army officer corps had long been
comprised of Sunnis who never allowed the Shia to gain any real
power in the army. The primary mission of the army was the
preservation of internal order over a population that was more than
60 percent Shiite, and 20 percent Kurd.

Since the 1980 's, most top government posts, including that
of President Saddam Hussein, have been held by Sunnis, thus
continuing to drive a wedge between the Sunnis and Shias.^^ Of
course, the concern about the Shia taking control became somewhat
dormant in the 1980 's when the Iraqi army (largely comprised of
Islamic Shia soldiers) was preoccupied in a war with Iran. Iran
was left economically and militarily weakened by the war and has
since embarked upon a progrcuti of rebuilding. Although President
Rafsanjani has improved relations with the west, there remains a
powerful radical fundamentalist faction within Iranian political
and religious circles. Iranian Islamic fundamentalists do not

18

appear to have any substantial influence over the Shia in southern
Iraq. There are even indications they are being moderated within
the Iranian government.

A POLITICAL BASIS FOR STABILITY AND ACCOMMODATION

Iraq has been a fragmented society struggling for nativ^nal
unity for over 70 years. The country's borders have no historical
basis and its society consists of minorities who remain fragmented.
The larger groups which include Sunnis , Shias, and Kurds; and the
smaller groups of Turcomans, Jews and Christians have been unable
to evolve into a cohesive society as the imposition of central
government policies has perpetuated existing volatile social
conditions and fostered mutual antagonism and suspicion. In Iraq
political organizations were far less developed than those in
Turkey, Syria or Iran as late as the 1940 's. Baathist ideas were
brought to Iraq by Syrian teachers late in 1949. The Baathists
tied the fulfillment of the emerging pan-Arab idea to the
disappearance of imperialism from the Arab world. In essence the
Baath party ideology was based on Arab nationalism and designed to
resolve the problem of minorities. The party was fraught with
internal struggles aggravated by ideological ambiguity which led to
the various military and civilian leaders to embrace different
aspects of socialist, secular, religious or revolutionary doctrine
to achieve their goals. This led to the emergence of divergent
groups and military cabals each vying for Baathist leadership.
Finally in 1968 the Baathists took power through a military-led

19

coup. They had once before, in 1963, reigned for a short period of
9 months after a successful coup. This time around they have
systematically neutralized their opposition, including the Kurds,
for 25 years through a mix of oppressive measures, ideology, and
the machinations of a charismatic leader - Saddam Hussein.

Many of the long list of Kurdish political parties have become
more or less irrelevant over the years. Strong tribal allegiances
remain an important part of Kurdish society and modern leaders must
have support from the tribal leaders in order to survive. Two
Kurdish parties which remain relevant and have been active during
the reign of Saddam Hussein and the Baath party are the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) . In
northern Iraqi Kurdistan the KDP led by Masoud Barzani is the more
traditional party with firm grass-roots connections through tribal
and local elders and community leaders. In central Kurdistan the
PUK led by Jalal Talabani is a more sophisticated, modern and urban
organization with strong connections with southern Kurdistan in
Iran. The PUK is less religious and less tribal oriented. The PUK
refers to the KDP as " the hillbillies who never cease to be an
embarrassment and who never lose an opportur Ity to lose an
opportunity.

Much has been written about the negative aspects of
traditional tribal politics and the associated antiquated methods
of doing business. National coherence has long evaded the Kurds
due in large part to their tribal social structure. In this
century, however, tribalism has waned and nomadism all but

20

disappeared as Kurds have become urban dwellers. Still, even
modern Kurdish leaders such as Jalal Talabani despite his
understanding of the West and long European residence has been
unable to completely stifle old tribal affinities and some
rivalries. Kurdish leaders have not always been judged by their
followers against the same standards as leaders in the West where
diplomacy is important. Kurdish leaders are looked upon as
concerned fathers as much as political leaders. Therefore, their
mistakes have seldom weakened their position as leaders as long as
they were perceived as doing what they could and the fundamental
virtues of courage, loyalty, dignity, and magnanimity were
maintained. The traditional power that had been wielded by tribal
chiefs or aghas, and to a lesser extent by Muslim sheiks came under
se] f examination at the end of the Iran/Iraq War. Kurdish
intellectuals and midlevel commanders ultimately blamed the
traditional Kurdish leaders for several major setbacks in their
progress. These included the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in
1975, the initiation of provocative actions that resulted in
Saddam's use of chemical weapons against them, the destruction of
their villages, and the massive relocation campaign in the
1980 's.^® This led in 1988, to the formation of the Iraqi
Kurdistan Front (IKF) from eight major Kurdish parties to begin
representing Kurdish interests. Although they continue to play
a major role in Kurdish affairs, there has been a gradual
assumption of power from the tribal chiefs and sheiks. This became
apparent when the IKF took over the political and civil

21

administration of Iraqi Kurdistan after the withdrawal of the Iraqi
central government from northern Iraq.

US POLICY AND THE KURDS

James Prince, a program assistant in the Middle East Studies
department at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote that
"United States policy toward the Iraqi Kurds was based on benign
neglect and political containment."*'^ This statement implies that
the US has had some responsibility to the Kurds, but history
clearly contradicts this notion. It would be more accurate to say
that the US has preferred to pursue foreign policy with officially
recognized governments of countries in the Middle East without
.involving itself in the internal politics of these countries.
Illustrative of this is the action taken by the US Secretary of
State which directed that all contact with Iraqi dissidents cease
after Iraq formally complained about the US Department of State
receiving Jalal Talabani in 1988. This policy was later reinforced
when Talabani, even with support from congressional leaders, was
again rebuffed by the State Department in August 1990, after Iraq
had invaded Kuwait.

It took the 1991 uprising of the Kurds following the Gulf War,
their subsequent flight, and the hosting of Kurdish leaders by the
French, British, and Turkish leaders before the US government
capitulated and set conditions for meetings with the Kurds.
Massive media coverage showing the inhumane conditions being
endured by Kurdish families and harsh actions being perpetrated

22

against the Kurds by Saddam's military forces had mobilized
American public opinion to call for the provision of humanitarian
assistance to the Kurds. The large death toll among men, women and
especially children evoked direct criticism from the media of the
US government for its failure to assist the Kurds and support the
Iraqi opposition. Finally, the State Department after
reconsidering its policies set the conditions to meet with the
Kurds by stating that it would not support any elements that
sought the dismemberment of Iraq and further stipulated that;

— the kurdish delegation must be representative and
include all religious and sectarian opposition elements; and

— the Kurds must allay the fears of their neighbors,
namely Turkey, that they harbored secessionist tendencies.*^ US
concerns about protecting Turkish interests is understandable
inasmuch as Turkey has served as the security anchor to NATO, in
the south, as a full member since 1952. Turkish security concerns
had long focused on the Soviet Union and although this dissipated
with the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey remains a pro-Western
oriented ally. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Turkey quickly confirmed
that NATO would come to its aid in the event of an attack by Iraq.
In early April 1991, while the US was grappling with what to do
about the Kurds, Turkey was faced with the more immediate
humanitarian problem of providing life sustaining assistance to
some 500,000 Kurds who were either massed along or had already
crossed into Turkish border areas. The Turkish government was
reluctant to allow the Kurdish refugees to move out of the

23

mountains to more accessible areas within Turkey for fear it would
incur the long-term obligation for their care and feeding.

It soon became clear that the situation had become untenable
and the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Kurds was
unsustainable. Ever mindful that the world was watching as the
Kurdish drama unfolded Turkish President Turgut Ozal, rather than
languishing in this untenable situation, decided to act. Ozal
concluded that the best solution was to move the Kurdish refugees
back to northern Iraq, but realized this was impossible without
providing the Kurds protection against Iraqi forces. This was a
very important and pivotal juncture in Turkish policy towards Iraq.
Until this point, Turkey had been "firmly in opposition to any sort
of partition of Iraq either implicit or explicit, which would imply
acceptance of the idea of Kurdish autonomy. Nonetheless, Ozal
suggested that a safehaven be established for the Kurds in northern
Iraq, through UN auspices, which was supported by Britain and the
US. This ultimately led to the initiation of Operation Provide
Comfort by coalition forces which established the currently
existing security zone to which the Kurds returned. Although most
ground forces have been withdrawn, the security zone continues to
be protected by a coalition special air detachment retained at the
Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey. The Turkish parliament has so
far renewed the mandate of the security force as well as their
cooperation in support of the security zone in six-month
increments.

24

IRAQ, THE WEST, AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS

After the Baathists gained power in 1968, Iraq was viewed in
American circles as being run by radical pro-Soviet extremists.
This perception precluded serious consideration of Iraq as a
potential pro-Western ally or even as a country with which to have
dialogue.^ The Baathist commitment to the fulfillment of pan-
Arabism and the eradication of imperialism from the Arab world adds
only another dimension to the problem. In addition, an
understanding of Iraq's strategic goals as expressed by Christine
Moss Helms in 1984, provides a portent of possible future
difficulties to be expected in dealing with Iraq. Helms wrote
that:

All states have minimum strategic
requirements, foremost of which are the
security of the state, national cohesion, and
access to the resources necessary to function
effectively as an economic and political
entity. In Iraq these requirements include
distribution rights to the waters of the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers, economic and
political integration of the northern Kurdish
and southern Shia areas within the state,
security of oil reserves and facilities, and
guaranteed safe passage for trade through the
Shatt al-'Arab and the Gulf. No treaty or
policy that fails to guarantee these rights
can be expected to ensure for long an attitude
of trust or stability in the development of
relations between Iraq and its neighbors or
with its foreign allies... A starting point in
developing the common interests of Iraq and
outside powers would be an expression of
mutual commitment to the territorial integrity
of nations and respect for the principle of
noninterference in the domestic affairs of
other countries.

25

Iraq under Saddam Hussein can be expected to be unyielding in
seeking the fulfillment of these strategic requirements. Saddam
sees himself as a great and influential leader as well as the
champion of all Arabs- He enjoys the popular support of large
segments of the people in many Arab countries even though most Arab
governments were against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The people
understand that Saddam is brutal and repressive but tend to support
his stand against the perceived evils of the West. Many Arabs on
the street have been convinced by Saddam that Western actions are
motivated by neo-colonialist aims designed to ensure access to oil
at cheap prices.'^ There is little documented information that
supports any real intention of Saddam to more fully integrate the
Kurds or Shia into the Iraqi political or economic spheres.

A POST-GULF WAR DIMENSION

It is well known that the Kurds' own tribalism and ideological
differences, coupled with international indifference to their cause
has impeded their progress. A milestone was achieved in 1988,
when the eight Iraqi Kurdish parties stopped fighting each other,
healed their internal rifts and formed the Iraqi Kurdistan Front.
The IKF espouses goals committed to democracy for Iraq and
autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan although a small minority of its
members support a goal of independence for Kurdistan. The IKF
Supreme Body comprised of two members of each party and chaired by
the leaders of the two main parties, Jalal Talabani of the PUK and
Massoud Barzani of the KDP, has provided political leadership and

26

administration in Iraqi Kurdistan since establishment of the
security zone by the coalition forces.

In addition to the IKF, most opposition elements including the
Kurds, Islamists, and former supporters of the Baath party were
united into a single association that resulted in the Iraqi
National Congress (INC). Kurdish leaders and religious Shia
leaders from southern Iraq agreed to work together, and initiated
a dialogue with over a dozen opposition leaders as early as
December 1990. A lot of effort was expended leading up to proposed
elections to ensure that the US wishes for a continuation of Iraqi
territorial integrity be understood and advocated.

Free elections were held in Iraqi Kurdistan on 19 May 1992,
in which a 105-seat National Assembly was elected from the eight
political parties and the few tribal leaders of the Iraqi Kurdistan
Front. The IKF which has been running things since the Gulf War is
now gradually transitioning authority to the elected Kurdish
parliament. The KDP captured 45 percent of the vote, and the PUK
won 43 percent in the elections which were conducted peacefully
and considered fair by outside observers. The KDP heads the
executive with a prime minister from the PUK and cabinet positions
divided equally between the two parties. The vast majority of
Kurds are represented by the KDP and PUK which have both openly
support a federal system in Iraq, and are against moves toward
Kurdish independence.

Three of the IKF's parties have been pushing for an
independent Kurdistan. They are The Party of Socialism in

27

Kurdistan (PASOK), the Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party (KPDP) ,
and the Kurdistan Socialist Party (KSP). The Islamic Party of
Kurdistan is opting for an Isleunic state. None of these parties
received the required 7 percent of the vote to win seats in the
parliament. The Assyrian Democratic Movement whose numbers are in
dispute were allocated five seats in parliament, irrespective of
votes received, to prevent international criticism and local
disapproval. The tribes were unable to muster the required 7
percent threshold for representation in parliaunent and its leaders
are frustrated as their power, prestige and authority
dissipates

The INC financially backed by Ahmad al-Chalabi, a European-
based Iraqi banker and his brother, Hassan al-Chalabi, a former
University of Baghdad law professor whose students included
Talabani, sponsored meetings in places such as Damascus and Vienna
in efforts to develop cohesion and a group supported political
agenda. These efforts paid off as an eight-member INC delegation
which included Barzani and Talabani was received by the US
Department of State in July 1992. This was perceived by the
diverse elements of the Iraqi opposition and most Middle East
observers as signaling US support for the newly elected Kurdish
government, and support for the Kurds in any future government in
Iraq after Saddam's ouster. After the visit to Washington,
unprecedented cohesion and coordination followed among Kurdish
leaders. Other opposition groups that had remained skeptical about

28

Kurdish aspirations now formally recognized the Kurdish lead which
included advocation of a Kurdish state within a federated Iraq.*^^

Federalism, however, is the most contentious issue of concern
to some groups within Iraq, while other Islamic groups outside Iraq
seem only to be acquiescing to the Kurdish goals. Groups outside
Iraq such as the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq and al-Dawa (both based in Iran), and Arab nationalists from
Syria and Saudi Arabia voted to "respect" Kurdish aspirations only
after much heated debate in a September 1992 conference. The vote,
reportedly, was overwhelmingly in favor of the Kurdish position
which suggests a positive aspect of the democratic process even if
reflecting only half-hearted concurrence. It is important to note
that Iraqi Sunni and Arab nationalists were the last holdouts
against federalism.

Other signs of caution were exhibited at the conference when
the Shia violently protested against the Kurdish proposal to staff
the INC Leadership Council of three with a Shia Muslim, a Sunni
Muslim, and a Kurd. The Shia who comprise over 60 percent of
Iraq's population felt underrepresented. The strength of the
Kurdish position based in part on the real and perceived US
support, as well as the international legitimacy and logistical
support being provided to them, persuaded the conferees including
the Shias to support the Kurdish proposal. Talabani nominated
Barzani to one of the three posts on the Leadership Council. The
other positions were filled by Mohammed Bahr al-Ulum, a moderate
Shiite clergyman, and retired Sunni Major General Hassan al-Naquib.

29

The move toward self-rule by Iraq's 3.5 million Kurds has concerned
Turkey, Iran and Syria, which also have large Kurdish
populations .

Economically, the international embargo against Iraq and the
Iraqi blockade of the north have stifled economic activity in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Agricultural products are unable to be exported, and
many factories lack spare parts to operate. The landlocked Iraqi
Kurdistan cannot function economically without an outlet through
Turkey, Syria or Iran.

CONCLUSION

When the countries of the Middle East were carved out of the
Ottoman Empire, the Kurds then lost the opportunity in the early
twentieth century to govern themselves. Thereafter, they have been
a disenfranchised group dominated and oppressed by the host nations
in which they live. Obviously, cultural, tribal and language
idiosyncracies coupled with extreme oppression perpetrated against
them, have encumbered their ability to emerge as an autonomous
group. Although tribalism still exists, it is not the scune
insurmountable obstacle of the past as Kurds have become more
urbanized. The Kurds in Iraq are better educated with the highest
literacy of all Kurds in Kurdistan.

In the last 25 years, Iraq has failed under Baath Party and
Dictator Saddam Hussein rule to establish a pluralistic political
community. This has contributed immensely to the continuing
inherent instability and violence which has dominated the political

30

arena. After many years of struggle and revolt seeking to achieve
democracy for Iraq and autonomy for Kurdistan, the Kurds got their
big break — the Persian Gulf War. The Iraqi Army had become the
fourth largest army in the world with a biological and chemical
capability. This was considered, along with the US policy of using
overwhelming force, when president Bush called for the Kurds in
northern Iraq and the Shia in southern Iraq to rise against Saddam
Hussein in the Persian Gulf War. The resulting crushing of both
revolts by Saddam, and the ensuing flight and agony suffered by the
Kurds brought them on center stage for the world to view. The US
pressured by the media and responding to the humanitarian need,
established along with coalition governments, a security zone in
northern Iraq for the Kurds, and later in southern Iraq for the
Shia. This has effectively split Iraq into three parts. (map Figure
3) Subsequently, the Kurds by holding elections, establishing a
government, and providing political and civil administration in
their area, Iraqi Kurdistan, now in essence have de facto autonomy.
This autonomy, however, cannot be sustained without US and
coalition military protection. The US, even in the final days of
the Bush administration, has demonstrated its resolve by continuing
to insist on implementation of UN resolutions, and even resorted to
military action to maintain protection of the southern security
zone.

A review of the events leading up to the current situation in
Iraq seems to suggest that the new Clinton administration should
stay the policy course set by the Bush administration. Most policy

31

makers recognize that access to oil and peace in the Middle East
region are indeed in the US interest, but do not necessarily view
US support to the Kurds as a means to those ends. Human rights,
however, have been articulated as a part of the US international
diplomatic agenda, and consequently cannot be ignored. Still it
would be a mistake to view the Kurds and their aspirations for
autonomy as the primary US goal in Iraq. Nonetheless, if the US
led coalition abandoned the Kurds while Saddam remains in power it
would be perceived as a sign of weakness in the international arena
and ultimately lead to renewed attacks by Saddam against the
Kurds . The goal should be to maintain the regional balance of
power and stability that can now only be achieved through a new
political order in Iraq. The Kurds are simply in a unique position
to benefit from the situation, and possibly become a part of the
political structure that will follow the Saddam regime.

Clearly, the Kurds now have de facto autonomy, and with
coalition security support, have led Iraqi opposition groups to
unprecedented levels of cooperation. In their quest for self-
government, the Kurds are openly committed to the preservation of
Iraqi territorial integrity, a pre-condition of continued US
support. This should be the primary determinant of current US
policy, rather than to allow policy to be driven by the known
desire of the Kurds to one day have their own separate state. The
Kurds simply could not be successful in any endeavor to achieve
autonomy in a separate state in the current political climate.
Iraqi Kurdistan is a landlocked area which requires access to the

32

transportation routes of neighboring countries for the transhipment
of goods. Turkey now reluctantly allows humanitarian assistance and
security elements to operate from its territory. However, neither
Turkey nor any other neighbor of Iraqi Kurdistan would support or
cooperate in the existence of a Kurdish state.

Iraq with its pluralistic characteristics is unworkable as it
has been governed in the past, especially under Saddam Hussein.
Therefore, some type federation of autonomous provinces may indeed
be the best next step for Iraq since, at present, there appears to
be no viable alternative.

33

Ethnoreligious Groups

“tr^r.c re:.g:c;.s crc-ps
pe'c&*"-t c‘ pcp«:at.or

IX K vrr^r^.

ENDNOTES

^Lawrence Ziring, The Middle East; A Political Dictionary
f Santa Barbara. Ca. ! ABC-CLIO. Inc.. 1992) 84-85.

^ Robert D. Kaplan, "Iraqi Indigestion," The New Republic,
(October 1990): 14.

^Ibid., 15.

'^Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in
Iraq, Saddam's Iraq; Revolution or Reaction (London; Zed Books
Ltd., 1986), 177.

^Foreign & Commonwealth Office, The Kurdish Problem in Iraq
(London, May 1992), 1.

^Pauletta Otis, Displaced Civilians in Zones of Conflict,
Case Study; The Kurds (United States Army, January 1990) 9-12.

^Helen Chapin Metz, Iraq; A Country Study (Washington,
D.C.; Department of the Army, 1990), 215-16.

^Ibid.

’ibid.

“'“ibid., 203.

^^Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2.

^^ibid, 4.

^^ibid., 3.

’’^Ibid, 4.

“■^Ibid, 4-6.

^^Otis, 10.

Chris Hedges, "Kurds Creating a Country on the Hostile
Soil of Iraq," New York Times. 12 August 1992, Al.

^®Ibid.

^’Hedges, A1,A6.

2°Otis, 15-16.

37

^^Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds; _ A Concise Handbook

{Washington, D.C.; Taylor & Francis, Inc., 1992) 179.

Short, Martin and Anthony McDermott. The Kurds. London:
Minority Group Studies Report, 1981, p.6.

^^Izady, 179.

^'^Izady, 180.

^^Ibid.

^^Izady, 179-80.

2^0tis, 15-16.

^®Christine Moss Helms, Iraqi; Eastern Flank of the Arab
World (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1984) 151.

^^Kaplan, 15.

^°0tis, 36.

^’’Helms, 187.

^^Metz, 95-6,

^^Abbas Kelidar, Iraq, The Search for Stability (London:
The Eastern Press, 1975) 3.

^"^Ibid, 7.

^^Izady, 207.

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid., 206.

James Prince, "A Kurdish State in Iraq? Current History
(January 1993): 18.

^^Ibid, 20.

"^^Ibid.

"•^Ibid.

"^^ibid.

38

Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf
Crisis, International Affairs 68,4 (1992): 688.

‘^Helms, 204.

^^ibid., 205.

'^^Mary E. Morris, "Regional Dynamics of the Gulf Crisis."
Paper presented to U.S. Naval Reserve, February 7, 1991, Los

Angeles, California.

^^Prince, 18-9.

"-^Ibid., 19-20.

^^Ibid., 21-22.

5°Ibid.

^^Associated Ptess, "Iraqi Opposition Picks Leaders,"
Washington Post, 1 November 1992, p. A35.

39

40

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